

OIR Contribution to
SIE-1
March 23, 1951

SIE-1: TERMS OF REFERENCE; CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

I. SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS

B. Political

SUMMARY

There have been no developments in Soviet political activity ~~toward Korea~~ during the past three months that indicate conclusively a Soviet intention to undertake any new action in the Far East.

a. With respect to Korea the Soviet position has continued to be that it is not directly involved in the conflict, but as the leader of the peace camp is interested in the northern Korean cause. During the past three months, however, the USSR has (1) opposed a cease-fire or a negotiated settlement on any except Chinese Communist terms; (2) condemned, and implicitly threatened, the UN for its action in naming Communist China an aggressor; (3) linked Japan with US "aggression" against China in Korea; and (4) publicly committed its (i.e. Stalin's) prestige to the ultimate triumph of North Korea.

b. With respect to Japan the USSR, together with Communist China, has (1) openly invoked the threat of reprisal on the basis of their mutual aid pact should Japan be rearmed or otherwise become involved in aggression against either power; (2) repeated charges that the rearming of Japan under US aegis is already proceeding and that Japanese resources and manpower are already being utilized in support of US aggression; and (3) linked Japanese

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rearmament with the German rearmament issue and with US aggressive plans generally.

✓ o. (Soviet) Soviet spokesmen have launched a campaign designed to prove that US aggressive plans include seizure of Russian territory.

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Discussion

Moscow's policy toward the Korean was has been one of continued reliance on military action by its associates and intransigence with respect to any settlement except on Soviet terms. Soviet activity in this regard has included the following:

(1) Opposition to cease-fire proposals in the General Assembly, support for Chinese Communist refusal to deal with the UN cease-fire commission in January and the Good Offices Commission from February to the present.

(2) After General Assembly condemnation of Chinese Communist aggression, a mounting campaign to discredit the action and the UN itself. The highlight of this campaign was Stalin's self-interview of February 16 in which he echoed Pravda's earlier castigation of the UN's "shameful" decision and warned that the UN was going the way of the League of Nations. The World Peace Council (WPC) on February 26 took up the cudgels with a resolution demanding that the UN annul its resolution. Investiqa endorsed this resolution on March 4.

(3) Continued insistence on previously-rejected Communist proposals. Stalin declared that if the US and UK "finally" reject Chinese proposals, the Western countries would only meet defeat in Korea. The WPC called for a multilateral conference on Korea to negotiate a Korean settlement based on a withdrawal of troops to allow an intra-Korean solution. This differed but little from Chinese Communist proposals in January which had urged a seven-nation conference in Communist China on the same basis.

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(4) Continued insistence on final victory, Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda continues to maintain that all of Korea is the Communist objective. In addition to his self-interview in which he committed his prestige to the Communist cause in Korea, Stalin in a message to Kim Il Sung on March 18 once more went on record for the North Korean cause.

(5) Emphasis on morale factor. Stalin on February 16 paid particular attention to the theme that morale will be a decisive factor in the Korean war and that UN forces suffer from their consciousness that they are fighting an unjust war. The unabated hammering by Soviet and Communist propaganda on alleged US atrocities -- including most recently the charge that the US is using poison gas in Korea -- is obviously designed to support anti-US feelings considered necessary in a prolonged war.

Partly in consideration of Peiping's role in Korea, Moscow has gone to considerable lengths to underscore its appreciation of that role and its solidarity with Communist China. In January, Bolshevik republished an old theoretical article by Mao, Pravda and the Cominform journal gave it laudatory reviews, and a Soviet publishing house reprinted it in thousands of copies. During the same month, Moscow ostentatiously announced that it had returned to Communist China hundreds of items of property due the Chinese under the February 1950 agreements. This move was publicized in connection with the first anniversary of these agreements which was celebrated with much fanfare in both the USSR and Communist China.

The USSR and Communist China have steadily been mounting a propaganda campaign on the issues of US intentions regarding Japanese rearmament and a

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peace treaty with Japan. Three major developments have marked this campaign:

- (1) Beginning with a Peiping editorial on January 28, Soviet and Chinese Communist spokesmen have openly invoked the threat of Sino-Soviet reprisal on the basis of their mutual aid pact should Japan be rearmed and a treaty concluded without Soviet and Chinese Communist participation. The USSR has also strongly reasserted the demand -- long since rejected by other interested nations -- that the US, UK, USSR, and Communist China first draft a treaty.
- (2) As a result of a formal statement by Malik on March 3, bilateral negotiations between the US and USSR have to all intents and purposes been broken off. These talks had been under way since October.
- (3) The USSR is mobilizing the world Communist movement to supplement its propaganda campaign against US intentions in Japan. The WPC on February 26 called for a plebiscite in Asia, America, and Oceania on Japanese re-militarization and a treaty as well as for a Communist regional conference regarding the Japanese problem.

With respect to Southeast Asia, there have been few developments directly involving the USSR. Soviet propaganda has echoed Chinese Communist outcries particularly against Thailand and British policy in Malaya. Ho's forces attempted large-scale actions during January but were driven back and despite persistent rumors of increased aid from the outside to the Vietnam Communists, the situation does not seem to have changed radically in the past few months.

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Beginning with the Pospelov speech on January 21, the anniversary of Lenin's death, the USSR has greatly intensified its efforts to show that the US continues to harbor aggressive (designs) on Soviet territory. US Far Eastern policy is interpreted as an important aspect of these designs. Emphasis has been placed on the theme that the US is the traditional enemy of the Soviet people. This line has been given a local twist by all the satellites including Communist China.

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dimensions of attack*

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III. COMPARABLE SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN OTHER AREAS THAN THE FAR EAST

D. Political

Soviet political activities with respect to Korea are of course without parallel in any other part of the world since Korea is the only area in which hostilities are actually under way.

Soviet political activities with respect to the Japanese rearmament issue are closely paralleled by activities relative to the German rearmament issue. However, treatment of Japan has been unique in that a link has been established between its remilitarization and actual US "aggression" in Korea.

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